

4. Arms Supply and Military Training

Obviously the Indonesian New Order government of General Suharto could not have launched the armed invasion of East Timor without the support of U.S. armor. But even if the Indonesian armed forces had managed to infiltrate into East Timor they could not have sustained their presence without foreign aid and foreign-supplied weapons. The fact of the matter is that Indonesia mounted a Vietnam-war style counter-insurgency operation in East Timor, that was highly militarized. It was also highly dependent, according to operation, upon air support attacks, naval bombardment, use of helicopter gun-ships, aerial defoliant use, deployment of tanks and armed personnel carriers, and, of course, large troop rotations. As in Aceh province of Indonesia in 2002-03, such an undertaking could not have been sustained without complex logistics, communications systems, training, and back-up supplied by Western arms suppliers and military establishments.

As with the U.S. in Vietnam, population control, “free fire zones,” the creation of partisans or militias, and a body count approach to victory, were all put in place by a military establishment with training and doctrinal links with U.S. and later Australian military academies. It is clear that the unarmed people of East Timor, not just the guerrilla (Falintil), were subject to cruel and relentless military assault practically without check over 24 years.

The arms trade with Indonesia should not be viewed in the abstract or as simply as statistical sets. There are few countries without standing armies or defense establishments and independent Timor-Leste has joined that list. By definition, the Indonesian New Order of General Suharto came to power in a bloodbath unleashed by ABRI-TNI against left-wing civilian opponents. For the duration of the Suharto dictatorship, Indonesia was at war with itself. No major power sought to succor the pro-democracy movement inside Indonesia. To the contrary, they were content to reward that country's military establishment. With full knowledge that the Indonesia of General Suharto faced no credible external enemy and no enemy except peoples striving for democratic, human and economic rights, Western arms suppliers to Jakarta answered to no morality except corporate greed or, in the language of successive Australian governments, "Asian links."

Moreover, the Indonesian doctrine of *dwi-fungsi* or dual function legitimized the dominant role of the military inside Indonesian society at the social, economic and political levels. It also was used to justify repression in East Timor and elsewhere, including pro-democracy groups. Military cooperation or military-links finds powerful ideological justification in Washington (London), and, in turn Canberra. Military establishments, serviced by officer training programs come to be linked doctrinally, sharing codes of behavior and operational modus operandi. Such links also served Washington's Cold War doctrine, especially as Jakarta emerged as a key Southeast Asian ally in the wake of the 1965-66 coup.

Ramos-Horta Statement

The statement by José Ramos-Horta in 1997 in his capacity as Special Representative of the National Council of Maubere (CNRM) and 1996 Nobel Peace Laureate is eloquent of the problem:

“Since 1975 Indonesia has been fighting a low-level war against the East Timorese military resistance and has simultaneously been exercising its troops in the use of arms against East Timorese civilians. For the Indonesian armed forces the East Timor conflict has not only been a profitable economic venture, but also a training ground for its best troops and best pilots... This training naturally involves use of the latest weaponry, bought from the West at great expense. To imagine otherwise, namely that Indonesia used its second-hand arms, or that they withheld use of sophisticated weapons out of respect for the East Timorese, does not stand up to reason. It is logical therefore to deduce that Indonesia bought the weapons with East Timor in mind, and the arms vendors sold those weapons that were most suited for a low-level insurgency in difficult terrain, such as exists in East Timor. Without appealing to the abundant evidence about the use of American and British arms against the East Timorese, reason makes it clear, that all parties in Indonesia and the West know the truth about the case.”

“In this clear case of Western arms manufacturers and governments collaborating with dictatorial and military regimes such as Soeharto's Indonesia, there is an important principle that must be drawn. This is that no country should be allowed the sale of arms of any kind to a non-democratic regime. In other words, all countries should actively prevent such arms being sold. The reasons for such a high-sounding principle are practical. Sales of this kind are immoral, potentially illegal, and strategically unwise. Arms sales to non-democratic or democratic regimes are immoral in the pure sense that they promote a world environment in which the solution for problems is sought through killing and fighting rather than through talking. But more particular is the immorality that stems from making arms available to leaders who are not accountable to their people for their actions, nor dependent upon them for their right to govern. They can act against their own people with

comparative impunity. Arms sales to such a leader is tantamount to giving a stick to a bully who is busy tying up his victim. With the stick he can prolong his power and oppress his opponents. The accountability of a leader must be a determining factor in any trading in weapons” (Ramos-Horta in ENAAT 1997, 9-10).

The United States

Given the key role of the United States in defense cooperation with the Indonesian New Order, it would be illustrative to examine the rationale of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) of the Department of Defense. According to the DSCA website:

“Military assistance is an integral part of the U.S. peacetime engagement strategy and directly contributes to American national security and foreign policy objectives...All components of the military assistance program enable friends and allies to acquire U.S. equipment, services and training for the legitimate self-defense and for participation in multilateral security efforts.”

[http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/military_assistance_p2htm]

Various kinds of military assistance are offered by the U.S. through the DSCA, including sales, financing, equipment grants and training. Military sales can be negotiated either directly with the U.S. government (Foreign Military Sales) or through a private company (Direct Commercial Sales). Under Foreign Military Financing, foreign governments receive congressionally approved loans or grants with which to purchase military items from the U.S. Emergency grants include the giveaway of Excess Defense Articles, and Drawdowns, which are provided in emergency situations. The U.S. also helps strengthen and train foreign militaries through the International

Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which allows foreign military officers to train in U.S. military institutions. Under the Department of Defense-sponsored Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), U.S. special operations forces are deployed overseas to conduct joint training with foreign militaries.

Another justification frequently offered in defense of military training programs (such as the Pentagon's IMET), is that personal links established offer a restraining influence, just as human rights training sets the correct tone. [We are reminded that East Timor's last Portuguese Governor, General Mario Lemos Pires, graduated from the U.S. Institute of National Defense]. While the Dili massacre exposed the dangers of open-ended military assistance and training, Indonesia was nevertheless able to diversify its sources of arms procurement and defense equipment to such non-traditional sources as Eastern Europe. As discussed below, it was also able to maintain continued backing in the area of military training, even for such discredited abusers of human rights as Kopassus, the Indonesian special forces unit, which was also deployed in East Timor.

The Invasion

We have discussed the purpose, and consequences of the visit of U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Jakarta in December 1975 [see *Diplomacy: United States*]. Aside from offering Suharto the green light for invasion, U.S. representatives also pledged a substantial increase in U.S. military aid to Indonesia for the following year. U.S. arms sales to Indonesia more than quadrupled from 1974 to 1975 from US\$12 million to more than US\$65 million, while U.S. military aid to Jakarta more than doubled from 1974 to 1976, from US\$17 million to US\$40 million (Hartung and Washburn 1997, 34).

From various sources we know that overwhelming U.S.-supplied or sourced weapons were used in the initial invasion of East Timor. From another sources, including East Timor testimony, we know that OV-10 Bronco and other U.S.-supplied weapons carried out extensive and continuous bombing missions in the interior highlands of East Timor, eradicating agricultural systems and forcing large segments of the population to flee to the lowlands.

According to a CIA newspaper report published in The National Times, owing to surprisingly strong Fretilin resistance, Indonesia soon became obliged to commit additional infantry battalions combined with a naval blockade. Commencing on 20 October, the first confirmed air strikes by Indonesia against targets inside East Timor were registered by the paper. These strikes included the use of such U.S. supplied military equipment as a B-26 bomber, C-47 transports (modified with U.S. assistance into AC-47 “Spooky” gunships (cf. Conway 2003, 224), several armed helicopters and P1-76 tanks. Not surprisingly, the use of such firepower achieved major effect in breaking the spirited Fretilin defense.

As confirmed in Congressional hearings before the House International Relations Committee in 1977, several major U.S. weapons systems were sold to Jakarta during this period (1976-77). These included Rockwell OV-10 “Bronco” counterinsurgency aircraft, three Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft, and 36 Cadillac-Gage-V-150 “Commando” armored cars. All were used directly in the invasion and occupation of East Timor, along with such other U.S.-supplied weapons, also referenced during the hearing, as S-61 helicopters, patrol craft, M-16 rifles, pistols, mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, ammunition, and extensive communications equipment (Hartung

and Washburn 1997). Taylor (1999, 84) writes that, by February 1977, six of the 13 Broncos delivered to Indonesia were in use in East Timor.

Despite its profession for human rights, the Carter Administration actually accelerated the arms flow to Indonesia. During the four years of the Carter Administration arms sales averaged \$112 million or more than twice the amount supplied to the Suharto regime by the Ford Administration. In May 1978, according to Budiarjo and Liem (1984, 30), in full knowledge of the ongoing Indonesian invasion of East Timor, visiting U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale finalized deals on 16 A-4 McDonnell Douglas “Skyhawks” attack aircraft, along with Bell UH-1H “Huey” helicopters. Another 16 “Skyhawks” were delivered in 1978, otherwise capable of spraying weapons fire and explosives over wide areas (Hartung and Washburn 1997). Even though the Carter Administration planned to eliminate military grant aid to Indonesia, as Hamish McDonald wrote in the *National Times* (30 May-4 June 1977), “under a quiet understanding worked out between Jakarta and Washington during the past two years, the cutting of U.S. defense giveaways will be more than counterbalanced by increased allocations to Indonesia of concerned credits between Jakarta and Washington” (*Tapol Bulletin*, no.22, June 1977, 7).

The Cover Up

It is no small matter, as Chomsky and Herman (1979, 143) report, that the U.S. government professed to know very little about anything that was happening during the pre-invasion period and, indeed, to have suspended military assistance to Indonesia from December 1975 until June 1976. Such, at least, is the refrain of the 1977-78 Congressional subcommittee enquiry into the use of U.S. weapons and human rights questions in Indonesia. According to Albinski (1977), it is clear

that the terms of American weapons supply were breached by Indonesia as the stipulation was that it be used for internal security and legitimate self-defense. However, at no time had any formal determination been made as to whether a substantial breach occurred and, indeed, at no time had Indonesia even been notified of the suspension. In sum, the ban was perfunctory, and not intended as a serious gesture. Even during the peak of the fighting inside East Timor, both the Ford and Carter administrations kept up combined naval exercises with Indonesia. Indonesia, moreover, actually remained an exception to the Carter Administration policy of scaling back its security assistance program generally. In a word, Washington [and Canberra] never allowed sentiment or human rights considerations to override defense relations with Indonesia.

The Reagan Administration kept up a steady stream of armaments to Jakarta, averaging over US\$40 million per year. In 1986 it approved a record US\$300 million plus in weapons sales to Jakarta, apparently including the first deliveries of 12 F-14 fighter planes. U.S. military sales to Indonesia peaked during the Reagan years as other Western European nations muscled in on the lucrative trade.

Sales to Indonesia under the Bush Sr. Administration dropped slightly to some US\$28 million per year. There is no question as well that the Hughes Corporation manufactured Palapa A, B, and C commercial communication spacecraft have had valuable military as well as non-military applications for Indonesia, including East Timor. Palapa A1, Indonesia's first domestic communications satellite, achieved orbit in July 1976, Palapa B1 (launched June 1983), and Palapa B2 launched February 1984, are second generation satellites designed and built by Hughes.

The Dili Massacre and Aftermath

Certain change occurred under the Clinton Administration, especially as members of Congress moved to block U.S. training funds on the ground of human rights abuses. The State Department also seeking to head off Congressional and human rights criticism, agreed to a voluntary ban on arms sales to Indonesia. Specifically in response to widespread disdain at the TNI role in the Dili massacre of November 1991, where Indonesian soldiers using U.S.-supplied M-16s killed over 270 people, Congress moved to cut off the IMET program for Indonesian soldiers the following year, a ban that holds to the present. In addition, Congress codified a State Department-initiated ban on public and private sales of small and light arms along with riot equipment to Indonesia, the first time that such an across-the-board prohibition of weapons sales to Indonesia had been imposed by the U.S.

Even so, as Joe Nevins has summarized of the Clinton years, while small and light arms, riot control equipment, helicopter-mounted weaponry, and armed personnel carriers were successively banned, the U.S. also provided over US\$500 million in economic support over an eight year period and sold or licensed hundreds of millions of dollars of weaponry to Jakarta (Nevins 2002, 631). But the Clinton Administration also came under heavy pressure from a circle of congressmen. For example, on 8 September 1993, responding to an amendment forwarded by Senator Russel Feingold, the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress adopted an amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill which effectively threatened Indonesia's ability to acquire American weapons. The Feingold amendment required the U.S. President to consider with Congress six criteria before authorizing any arms sales to Indonesia. These related to human rights in East Timor, demilitarization, and Indonesian cooperation with the UN talks. Indonesia responded in the

strongest terms. Even Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating intervened in defense of a “balanced” picture of human rights in Indonesia. But the Feingold amendment did not become law (cf. Inbaraj 1995, 117-20). However, in 1993, Congressional pressure had halted the transfer of F-5 fighters and, in 1995, the ban was extended to include helicopter-mounted armaments and armored personnel carriers (1996) (Hartung and Washburn 1997).

In a major step, on 12 November 1997, the U.S. Congress voted new legislation included in the 1998 appropriation bill requiring that any contract to sell lethal equipment including helicopters to Indonesia state that the U.S. “expects that the items will not be used in East Timor.” ETAN describes the Bill as unprecedented because of the implied recognition that East Timor was separate from Indonesia.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon kept up its relationship with the TNI through Joint Combined Exchange Expanded IMET (E-MET) program. Among other course taught to TNI units, including the dreaded Kopassus red berets, under JCET program were such activities as “Psychological Operations,” Close quarters combat,” and “Military operations in urban terrain.” Kopassus had already been accused of involvement in kidnappings and torture of anti-government activists. In early 1997 Congress learnt that the Pentagon had been training the Indonesian military in this program without congressional notification or approval throughout 1996. In response, Congress limited appropriations to E-MET from 1997 to 2000. While the JCET program was technically legal, many in Congress felt that the Pentagon had clearly circumvented the intent of the IMET ban. Bowing to adverse publicity (Nation Magazine), ETAN's exposé, and Congressional intervention, the program was only suspended in May 1998.

Journalist Allen Nairn, who gained access to Defense Department documents, revealed that much of U.S. training was focused on Kopassus. This involved at least 36 exercises involving fully-armed U.S. combat troops sailing or flying into Indonesia. Of the 28 army/air force exercises known to have been conducted since 1992, Pentagon documents indicate that twenty involved Kopassus. One of these exercises was conducted in illegally-occupied East Timor (Tapol Bulletin, no.146, April 1998, 15).

Only in the teeth of the TNI-militia rampage – or actually after the event, as far as most of the killing was concerned – the U.S. government announced on 9 September 1999 that it was freezing all military programs, including joint exercises and officer training exchanges. The order, also known as the Leahy Law, was passed into law in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2000.

The Pentagon also dropped an invitation for General Wiranto to attend a meeting of Asia Pacific defense chiefs in Hawaii in October. While the U.S. balked at sending peacekeepers as requested by Australia, on 12 September at the APEC conference in Auckland U.S. President Clinton reiterated the end to all military cooperation assistance and sales to Indonesia, adding that Indonesia could assume a cutoff of international economic assistance should there be no improvement. Even so, by this juncture, Congress had already trimmed U.S. military aid to Indonesia to some US\$476,000 a year.

Under the Leahy Law of 2000, military aid to Indonesia was made conditional on the safe return of East Timorese refugees and bringing to justice those responsible for the violence and destruction following the 30 August ballot. But since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the two

countries have agreed in a joint statement to resume regular meetings between their militaries.

Under the rubric of “counter-terrorism” Washington lifted the embargo on sales of non-lethal items in ways that circumvent the Leahy Law.

Taking stock, as a study by the World Policy Institute released in 1997 revealed, the U.S. supplied a grand total of \$1.1 billion worth of weaponry to Indonesia in the twenty years following the invasion of East Timor. This included 229 military aircraft; 264 missiles; 9 combat ships; 402 armored combat vehicles; large quantities of guns and ammunition, including 15,000 M-16 rifles. Another disturbing finding of the Institute, not exclusive to scandals surrounding the Clinton administration, was the proclivity over the years of the U.S.-based arms industry to lobby Washington on expanded sales to client regimes, Jakarta included (“Document: Arms Sales to Indonesia,” east.timor@isc.apc.org, 4 March 1997).

European Suppliers

Since the mid-1980s Jakarta commenced too diversify its weapons sources turning to Britain, France, Germany and other Western European suppliers. In the case of the UK, weapons supplies to Indonesia reaches back to the 1960s. What appears to be a constant in British supplied equipment is that from water cannons, to armed personnel vehicles, to fighter jets, all have been employed in actions against internal opponents of the Suharto regime from demonstrators, to separatists, and the East Timorese people. Of course, European arms suppliers under the scrutiny of parliaments, publics, and watchdog-groups, seek to explain the conditions imposed upon armament use, and have sometimes been quick to protest the abuse of such equipment, in the authoritarian Indonesian New Order there was no public accountability. East Timor, Aceh, Papua, and the

Malukus were simply off the map. In the case of the UK, notwithstanding parliamentary opposition and a sophisticated campaign, Foreign Secretary in the Blair Labour government, Robin Cook, only announced a suspension.

United Kingdom: One of the more controversial arms deals involving a European country and Indonesia was the case of the British (BAe) supplied Hawk aircraft combining a number of capabilities including ground attack, along with reconnaissance. According to Budiarto and Liem (1984, 30-31), the first deal with British Aerospace was signed in April 1978 for the purchase of eight ground attack Hawks. In June 1993 the UK government signed a deal for \$815 million for sale of eight Hawk 100 advanced trainer/light attack and 16 Hawk 200 single seater fighters plus training and equipment.

Opposition to the sales of the Hawks emerged from a wide spectrum of British politics, but was joined by Tapol at an early date. Tapol rationalized its campaign against the sales of the Hawks in the following words:

“Because the Hawk is able to carry large quantities of weapons, including rockets, bombs and napalm, there are fears that the planes will be put to use in East Timor, where the Indonesian military has been unable to overcome the stiff resistance put up by the East Timorese people and Fretilin. The jets could shift the balance of power in this war of annexation and cause ever larger casualties among the civilian population. 100,000 people, one-tenth of East Timor's population are estimated to have been killed already” (*Tapol Bulletin*, no.27, April 1978).

In November 1994 the London Observer reported that the UK had entered into a secret defense deal with Indonesia involving a \$3.2 billion package including six Hawks, armored personnel carriers, along with medium range ballistic and air defense missiles (cited in Inbaraj 1995, 161). Commenting upon the 1993 sale, the UK armed services minister Archie Hamilton stated; “The point of selling Hawk aircraft to Indonesia is to give jobs to people in this country. There is no doubt in my mind that a Hawk aircraft can do nothing to suppress the people of East Timor. The aircraft is not suitable for that purpose and we have guarantees from the Indonesians that the aircraft will not be used for internal repression” (Inbaraj 1995, 110-11).

On 21 November 1996 the UK government announced the issue of export licenses for 16 Hawk aircraft to Indonesia plus associated equipment. The deal was worth approximately US\$489 million. In December 1996, Alvis 50 Scorpion armored vehicles were contracted in a deal worth US\$130 million.

While U.S. arms were used to facilitate the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, the Labour government of Tony Blair had the dubious distinction of being Indonesia's principal arms supplier in the run-up to the ballot, and not suspended until after the worst of the devastation. Obviously the Blair government, which came to power in 1997, chose not to revoke contracts for the export of aircraft to Indonesia inherited from the previous Tory government, despite a large groundswell of parliamentary opposition. Legal opinion advised that UK interest would not have been damaged had 125 of these defense-related contracts had been terminated. In Britain, the arms trade is subsidized by taxpayers through guarantees provided by the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). As *Tapol Bulletin* (no.143, October 1997, 7) underlined:

“Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's announcement on 28 July (1997) of new arms export licensing criteria was a bitter disappointment to those hoping that the Labour Government's official foreign policy would stop arms sales to Indonesia. The Government failed the litmus test of its new policy by refusing to revoke licenses granted last year by the Conservative Government and refusing to ban future arms exports. Sadly, as many feared, it is business as usual.”

Arms sales aside, as Nevins (2002, 632) elaborates, Labour under Blair actually strengthened ties with Indonesia's military. Some dozens of senior Indonesian military officials received training in British military establishments in the UK. Such policy was defended by government as “constructive engagement” or in support of good governance and greater respect for human rights. One delivery of Hawks to Indonesia was actually held up in Bangkok on the eve of the August 30 ballot. Undoubtedly an agreement between King's College in London and the University of Hull to offer training courses to Indonesian officers in 1997 came unstuck owing to solidarity actions that year. The Seeds of Hope or Ploughshare group which, in January 1996, had successfully invaded an airfield and disarmed a Hawk destined for Indonesia had already publicized the case. In a celebrated legal case, the four women defendants were exonerated by a British court, maintaining that they were acting to prevent crimes under the Genocide Act of 1969 and the Offenses Against Persons Act of 1965. [see International Solidarity]

On 2 July 1996, José Xanana Gusmão, signing himself as Commander of Falintil, wrote a letter from Cipinang prison offering sympathies to the women, then in prison awaiting trial. He wrote: “Dear friends we were greatly touched by the courageous protest action that you undertook against

the sale of more weapons by the British Government to the colonial regime in Jakarta” (Gusmão 2000, 209).

As José Ramos-Horta (1997, 10-11) commented on the case:

“For their example of courage and hope [I] salute the four Ploughshare ladies of Britain. Quite deliberately, yet unexpectedly, they brought about a watershed both in the campaign against arms trading, and in the campaign to stop arms destined for East Timor. Their struggle and their exoneration – indeed justification – will lighten the burden of future campaigners. For they have handed on two important messages. First, ordinary people, as represented by the Liverpool jury, are fair-minded, once given the truth. This gives hope for the future; the underdog is now championed by public opinion. Second, we all – individuals, arms manufacturers, governments – have a duty to participate in refusing to games.”

In the mid-1990s reports of over-flights of British-supplied Hawk aircraft came to be reported in East Timor. Specifically this was reported in the Independent on Sunday by journalist Hugh O'Shaughnessy who witnessed Hawks overflying Dili on 10 November 1995, attracting a denial from the British Foreign Office. In the period preceding the August 1999 ballot, three Hawk aircraft were moved to Kupang and deployed on interception missions against foreign (Australian) military aircraft movements in the East Timor area. According to resistance leader Konis Santana, cited in the Independent newspaper (Sue Lloyd-Roberts, 27 March 1997), British Hawks killed hundreds of East Timorese in actions against villages during 1978-79. Thereafter, he asserted, they were used to intimidate the East Timor people. From his prison cell in Cipinang, Xanana Gusmão

offered the following comment to journalist John Pilger, subsequently published in the *Guardian* (London), 2 December 1995, *Nation* (Bangkok), *The Irish Times* and *The Canberra Times*.

“In the early years American Bronco and Skyhawk aircraft relentlessly bombed and machine-gunned the camps and wells of the refugee population. And the new aircraft sold by Britain will invariably be used in East Timor. As for the denials that the Hawks will not be used against us the Western powers, concerned primarily with profits, have made these lies the conditions for the continuing sale of arms and ammunition. The British government must accept its share of moral responsibility for the war in East Timor. The immoral sale of 24 Hawks provides Jakarta with the approval it requires that it may continue to persecute and murder with impunity” (*Tapol Bulletin*, no.132 December 1995, 2).

Opponents of the British Hawk and Scorpion tank sales to Indonesia would have felt a sense of déjà vu, when in June 2002, Hawks and Scorpion tanks were pressed into action against rebel forces and the civilian populations who supported them in Aceh province. Answering back to such critics as Tapol, one Army spokesperson asserted that “the people bought them to defend the country.” In a refrain familiar to those long supporting demilitarization in East Timor, the TNI spokesperson for Aceh, asserted. “There is no need for permission...if we purchase something we can use it for anything.” The British government remained adamant that British weapons were not used offensively or in breach of human rights (“Army defends use of British tanks in Aceh,” *Suara Timor Lorosae*, 25 June 2003, p.9).

Holland: As the former colonial power, the Netherlands has long been involved in various kinds of defense links in Indonesia. Reaching back to the 1950s, Holland handed over a factory for the

production of light weapons, today known as PT Pindad. Holland, however, would re-emerge during the Suharto years as a major supplier of naval hardware. According to SIPRI yearbook of 1993, Holland emerged in the 1988-92 period as the second largest supplier of arms to Indonesia after the U.S. But through the early 1980s, Holland also faced down large civil society opposition to even naval sales to Indonesia, a movement which re-emerged after the Dili massacre.

Germany: Although the data is even less transparent on arms shipments and supplies from Germany, especially under the Chancellorship of Herman Kohl, Germany emerged as a major military supplier of the Indonesian state, just as the relationship with Suharto and Kohl developed on a personal basis. Between 1990-93 the German government approved arms sales to Indonesia worth over US\$600 million, a figure including only the arms and not the services. One notorious deal was the sale of 39 warships belonging to the former East German navy. But the list includes Exocet missiles, patrol-boats, tools, and machinery equipment for the production of torpedoes, G-3 assault weapons, and MP-5 machine guns dedicated for Special Forces. But the most important area, and most difficult to quantify, was the licensed production inside Indonesia of arms.

Not surprisingly, B.J. Habibie, as former manager of Messersmit Bolkoff and Blohm, emerged as a key broker in the German-Indonesia arms trade. As Minister of Science and Technology, Habibie presided over a veritable armaments empire including IPTN Indonesia's burgeoning aviation industry, an industry that produced the military version of a German helicopter, BO 105, documented to have seen service inside East Timor. German submarine and warship construction and maintenance was also part of the exchange with more than 1,000 Indonesian technicians trained in German shipyards (Kolling 1997, 72-77).

France: From 1994, driven by an aggressive government-commercial strategy, French arms sales to Asia eclipsed such traditional markets as the Middle-East for the first time. Sales range from missile launchers to armored personnel carriers, to high-tech communications systems. The inventory of air force sales to Indonesia includes Aerospatiale Puma and Super Puma helicopters, with manufacturing licenses accorded in 1991. The Thompson group of companies likewise supplied a range of military and communications materials. Cooperation was not restricted to arms sales but also extended to exchanges of defense personnel.

Spain: Indonesia has a special place in the Spanish arms trade, especially flowing from its collaboration with Nusantara Aircraft Industries in which Spanish technology is transferred for the local Indonesian production of aircraft, certain types of which have been adopted for military use.

The Australian Role

Australia long served a supplementary defense support role in Indonesia alongside the U.S. Australia's Defense Cooperation Programme (DCP) with Indonesia began in 1973. But, by 1993, as the U.S. downsized its military training support in reaction to the Dili massacre, Australia emerged as the leading foreign provider of military training to Indonesia.

From small beginnings, the DCP involved the transfer to Indonesia of a squadron of Sabre jets, eight patrol boats, and personnel exchanges. Over the 1972-75 period the DCP was budgeted for A\$20 million. Richard Tanter (1980, 37) writes that expanded regular defense aid program to Indonesia commenced in a fairly ad hoc way with the 1972 offer by the McMahon government of 6 ex-RAAF Avon Sabre fighter jets (with 16 jet fighter aircraft delivered in 1973). Citing a Canberra

Times report of 4 February 1977, Tanter writes that in February 1977 the Malaysian government offered the Indonesian military four Sabre jets as a source of spare parts for the Indonesian Sabres. Tanter (1980, 37) allows that the Sabres did not see combat in Indonesia, but have undoubtedly been used as a “stepping stone” towards training in the expansion of the Indonesian air force with more modern equipment.

Over the years Australian military assistance to Indonesia focused upon a number of core projects which, by 1980, expanded to include maritime patrol projects (aircraft, patrol boats, and advisors), a joint topographical and geological mapping project, provision of field communication equipment, and helicopters, research programs, and joint exercise and training facilities. Also, by that stage, a regular intelligence exchange program had commenced.¹

Naval Blockade

Tanter (1980, 38) continues that, by 1980, the largest single item in the program was the provision of Australian-made Nomad aircraft, De Havilland patrol boats, refurbished Attack class patrol boats, and a Royal Australian Navy advisory team. He explains that the stated intention of the program was to provide the Indonesian Navy with facilities to counter international and domestic inter-island smuggling. While this goal was enhanced, Tanter argues that the Australian equipment “very substantially” added to the ability of the Indonesian armed forces to carry out the invasion of East Timor. With reason, Tanter adds that “A crucial and continuing part of the Indonesian strategy in the invasion of East Timor was the establishment and maintenance of a blockade around the whole island of Timor to prevent the movement of news and information, medical and military supplies, food or people into East Timor except under Indonesian control.” Moreover, “the

Indonesian air and naval surveillance capacity together with the Indonesian government's refusal to guarantee non-combatant status to barges loaded with medical supplies from Australian church and aid groups, led to the Australian government's refusal to allow the barges to sail.” [see Humanitarian Assistance].

Taylor (1999) also writes that, in the early months of 1977, the Indonesian navy ordered missile-firing patrol boats from the Netherlands, Taiwan, South Korea, the U.S. and Australia to replace aging Soviet versions. For Taylor, the reason for this rapid procurement was clear, “to reinforce the naval blockade of East Timor.”

Australian Military Training Assistance to Indonesia

In the 1971-80 period, at least 890 Indonesian servicemen had received training in a range of courses in such Australian military establishments as Duntroon, Queenscliffe Australian Staff College, and the Canungra School of Military intelligence. Training, Tanter (1980, 38) explains, was a key part of Australia's military assistance program with Indonesia. Writing long before the Dili massacre, Tanter explains that the Indonesian government gave no assurances that its Australian-trained servicemen would not be used in the invasion of East Timor or to join tours of duty in East Timor, indeed all the more likely to be placed in East Timor given their leadership training and exceptional combat circumstances.

Evidence emerged in May 1974 (as confirmed in the Australian Senate) that Indonesian officers were trained by their Australian counterparts in “hostile interrogation” techniques. This owed to the revelations of Carmel Budiarjo of Tapol that Indonesian military interrogators were being trained at

Woodside in South Australia, in turn prompting an enquiry by the Australian Minister of Defense, Lance Barnard. Reportedly, Barnard acknowledged a training program in Australia for military personnel from Indonesia and Malaysia (*Tapol Bulletin*. No. 5, June 1974). Further context on Australian military intelligence training for officers from Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries was revealed in a program shown on ABC television in June 1974.

Although personnel exchanges were suspended after the invasion of East Timor, material supplies was kept up. The DCP, which was in the range of A\$2.2-9.9 million, was stopped abruptly by the Indonesia side in 1988 following an alleged affront to Suharto by the Sydney Morning Herald, a reference to the “Jenkins article affair” [See International Media]. While Australia was not a large arms supplier to the Suharto regime, there is no question that defense sales were always in mind, especially given a certain complementariness in logistics and other areas.

But even when the U.S. Congress suspended military training to the TNI, Australia began to take up some of the slack. In 1993 Australian Special Air Services (SAS) exercised with Indonesia's special forces, Kopassus, in their base in west Java. Even though exposed for their proclivity to human rights abuses, disappearances, and other crimes, Kopassus then commenced training in Australia. The following year an Australian Army battalion flew to east Java to take part in the first-ever combined airborne defense exercise in an action involving Kostrad Battalion 302, earlier pulled out of East Timor in disgrace. In March 1995, Battalion 302 was invited to training exercises in Queensland.

At least, from August 1993 onwards, Amnesty International weighed in criticizing military links with Kopassus. Directing their appeal to Australian Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans,

Amnesty International stated that Kopassus had been associated with gross human rights violations in East Timor, Papua, Aceh and throughout Indonesia. Gareth Evans is reported to have said, “any training that's done of Indonesian military personnel is designed to improve leadership skills...not in any way designed to improve the capability of the Indonesians in dealing with internal situations.” As the Australian Minister of Defense stated during the training of Kopassus in March-April 1994, the “Training of any regional military personnel in Australia aims to foster a regional defense relationship. It is not designed to improve the capability of Indonesian armed forces to deal with internal security matters” (Guthrie 1997, 240).

Looking back, it is surprising that even the Australian Labor Party in opposition called for more spending on defense ties with Indonesia, especially when vociferously opposed by East Timor solidarity groups. In 1994 the Australian Opposition spokesperson for defense said that, “There is more that needs to be done and the Government ought to put more money where its mouth is in its defense co-operation program” (The Australian, 22 July 1994). He was responding to a “confidential” assessment of Australian defense links with Indonesia prepared by the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, calling for expanded material and human support for Indonesia's “obsolete” armed forces. The Opposition spokesperson also supported Indonesian participation in the upcoming Kangaroo 95 military exercises in Australia's Northern Territory. In the way of heading off protest, the Canberra government had secretly invited the Indonesian armed forces to participate in what would be the first major Indonesian military exercise on Australian soil.

In 1993, 220 Indonesians were attending staff colleges and military institutes in Australia, making Australia the leading foreign trainer of Indonesian defense force personnel. Over the 1994-95 period to 1999-2000, the numbers of Indonesian personnel participating in Australian Defense Force (ADF) training programs were:

1994-95, 160 (128 in Australia; 32 in Indonesia)
1995-96, 197 (129 in Australia, 161 in Indonesia)
1996-97, 236 (125 in Australia, 111 in Indonesia)
1997-98, 201 (111 in Australia, 90 in Indonesia)
1998-99, 197 (137 in Australia, 60 in Indonesia)
1999-00, 200 (approx)

The 1999-2000 Australian Budget allocated \$7.25 million to defense co-operation with Indonesia. This period obviously coincided with the events and debates surrounding the 30 August ballot. From information supplied to the Australian Senate Committee by the Defence Department, Australia was in the process of shifting its training priorities towards more in-country training and a “train-the-trainer” approach. Even so, this approach was biased towards saving costs and increasing the number of graduates. The Defense Department submission also indicated that “there is considerable potential to increase our co-operation in strategic planning processes and human and resource management” (Australian Senate 2000, 201-02), a revelation that no major review of the training program was then in sight, at least before the militia violence became an avalanche. The review of Australia's defense links with Indonesia was only announced on 10 September 1999 in direct response to events in East Timor. According to the Senate report, this led to a “significant scaling back across a wide range of activity.” Notably, land forces exercises and Special Forces contact were terminated. Military skills training was also suspended. Nevertheless, the agreement for the framework of activities around which defense force cooperation took place remained in existence and “there continued to be a low level of activity in the relationship.” However, staff college level exchanges and educational activities continued (Australian Senate 2000, 206).

Various post mortem on Australia's defense relationship with Indonesia were canvassed by the Senate Report enquiry from a range of specialists, academics, and others. On 2 May 2000, Prime Minister John Howard said that it was “too early” to talk about renewing Australia's defense ties with Indonesia.

The Australian-Indonesian Agreement to Maintain Security

In 18 December 1995 the Australian government (Labor government of Paul Keating) secretly negotiated a security treaty with Indonesia dubbed the Australian-Indonesian Agreement to Maintain Security. Later made public, the agreement signed by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and his Indonesian counterpart Ali Alatas, specified (Article 1), that both countries undertake to consult at ministerial level on a regular basis about matters affecting their common security and to develop such cooperation and that of the region.” Obviously, as a security agreement, it was silent on questions of democracy, human rights and, by pledging to respect Indonesia's territorial integrity, it was silent on the question of East Timor self-determination (ENAAT 1997, 116-17). Although signed by the Labor government, the incoming Liberal government quickly endorsed the Agreement.

Also, in 1995, the Australian Defense Department invited to Canberra, Major-General Panjaitan, the senior officer responsible for the Dili massacre, seemingly oblivious of the fact that a U.S. court had earlier ruled in favor of compensation to the mother of Kamal Bamadaj, slain in the massacre. Obviously, assurances from the Australian side that military links with Indonesian, even including special forces, serve to sensitize such units to civilian rule and human rights rings hollow,

especially if we care to study the history of the armed forces in Indonesia. The falsity of such as argument was exposed time and time again, such as by the events of September 1999. The Indonesian “betrayal” of September 1999 of course demonstrated the bankruptcy of the argument, although Australian intelligence and the Canberra government had closely monitored the preparations for the violence.

By any measure, an affront to Australian democratic principles, the Australian-Indonesian security agreement of 1995 was unilaterally abrogated by Indonesia on 16 September 1999 during the wave of anti-Australian nationalism that accompanied the INTERFET intervention (ENAAT 1997, 116-17). At the time, Indonesian Political and Security Affairs Minister Feisal Tandjung cited Australia's decision to review or cancel a number of bilateral military activities “as among the reasons for Indonesia's decision.” He also stated that “the attitude and actions of Australia were no longer consistent with the spirit and letter of the Agreement” (Australian Senate 2000, 195). Even so, the Canberra government is again eager to resume defense collaboration with Jakarta.

Movement Against Arms Trade

After the Dili massacre certain traditional arms suppliers to Indonesia commenced to introduce partial arms embargoes upon Indonesia. These countries included the U.S. in 1992, Sweden in 1994, and Belgium and Italy in 1996. In 1994, as intimated, the U.S. also refused to sell fighter aircraft to Indonesia. Even so, the arms embargoes by Belgium and Italy were easily circumvented. But as ENAAT (1997) pointed out, while the U.S. and Sweden banned the export of armored vehicles to Indonesia, the UK and France stepped in competition with other European countries.

The example of Indonesian repression and grave human rights violations, actually activated debate over the arms trade in a number of European parliaments in the 1990s. Similarly, under intense pressure from NGOs, powerful Congressional lobbies, the Clinton administration was obliged to reign in its military support for the dictatorship, although even that statement has to be qualified in the lights of enduring links.

In November 1994, the European Parliament called for member states to “stop all military assistance and arms exports to Indonesia.” Current to 1997, the European Parliament had adopted five resolutions on the matter. In Europe the movement also reached the heights of national parliaments, leading some traditional exporters of arms to link arms sales to progress on human rights (Italy). Even so, assurances that arms are not being used for repressive purposes, did not always ring true. Restrictions were often circumvented under the pressure of aggressive state armament and business lobbies. In some cases (Australia), defense agreements were made in secret without parliamentary consultation.

Obviously little of the above information would even be made known, at least outside of scattered defense and security publications without the role of the international campaign against the arms trade. To be sure concerns over the proliferation of small arms, landmines, etc., have entered the UN agenda.

Notes

1. Relevant declassified documents on Australian defense cooperation with Indonesia for the period through to 1974 can be found in Australian National Archives [Series A1838 696/2/2/1 Part 10; 11:

12.] Inter alia, the documents reveal a stated policy by Australia not to offer support to the Indonesian police, deemed inseparable from the military structure, and not to condone the use of military aid against political opponents. In practice, however, Australia had little control over how its military aid was used and how its graduate trainees were deployed. As W.M.B. Smithies for First Assistant Secretary of the Defence Planning Division wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs on 4 June 1974, “Our understanding is that all Australian aid has always been provided on an unconditional basis...no restrictions or conditions have been imposed upon any material provided under defence aid or defence cooperation programmes administered by this Department” [with the single exception of disposal of ex-RAAF F86 Sabres to a third party without U.S. permission.]

